Does ought imply can? Analytical philosophy has had much to say about promising and the relationship between what the promiser is obliged to do and what they can do. In her chapter “Promising Too Much” in the bundle Promises and Agreements: Philosophical Essays, philosopher Julia Driver tackles the problem of overpromising. Specifically, she examines the conditions and norms involved in expectations surrounding promising. Different ethical traditions provide different answers to considerations regarding promising, breaking promises, and compensating for broken promises.

Driver examines in detail one manifestation of overpromising, namely making two incompatible promises. Subsequently, she examines related possible problems such as proposing to break a promise, trying to break a promise, and saying you will break a promise. These cases not only highlight the conditional nature of (over)promises, but also raise the question whether ought implies can. In other words, can an agent only take on an obligation if it is an obligation they are able to fulfill? If this were indeed the case, Driver argues, we immediately run into problems for the case of promises. An agent making a promise could subsequently purposefully maneuver themselves into a situation where they are unable to fulfill their promise and be free from blame. Intuitively, most people find this unconvincing. Therefore, Driver argues that there can be promises that cannot be kept, but which still entail obligations.

Driver’s philosophical analysis of overpromising is situated in a relatively niche debate within analytical philosophy, but provides useful insights for the analysis of overpromising in science. All of the covered instances of overpromising and related concerns, also occur within science. Moreover, Driver provides fruitful ethical standards – even if one disagrees with her ethical framework – that can be used to evaluate scientists who are indeed “Promising Too Much”.