The characterization of something as "hype" means to pose a problem. But what exactly constitutes the problem of hype? Broadly speaking, hype involves the exaggeration of the “significance or certainty of research findings” imposing risks on audiences (p. 1). According to Kirsten Intemann, however, the debate so far missed a proper theorization. Thus, many empirical results have not been comparable and solutions to address this problem are hardly found (p.2). Therefore, she takes the debate a good bit further by approaching “hype” (and its twin, “alarmism”) as “a value-laden concept” that depends on “the proper goals of science communication in specific contexts, and (2) judgments about what constitutes an “exaggeration” in that context” (p. 2).

The author begins her thoroughly concise argument, with an overview and exemplification of the five goals of science communication, to further outline the problem of hype as going beyond good scientific practice. These are (1) accuracy, (2) understandability, (3) predictive relevancy, (4) generating enthusiasm or interest, and (5) facilitating trust (p. 4). Thus, it is reasonable that, for example, early science communication about the Covid-19 pandemic, focused and simplified pandemic studies to help decision-makers and make a wider audience understand it (p. 3). Another example is grant proposals that generate interest by optimistically estimating the applicability and societal benefits of – at that stage of research – only potential findings (p. 8). The examples point out that the exaggeration of evidence can serve a function in particular contexts: “while both hype and alarmism involve exaggeration, not all exaggeration is inappropriate or constitutes a communicative error.” (p. 13). It is precisely the communication contexts that make the exaggeration of evidence problematic.

This leads to Intemann's core thesis that “whether or not exaggerations are inappropriate depend on value judgments about (1) what the most important goals of communication in a particular context are, and (2) whether there is sufficient evidence given the risks of error.” (p. 13) The classification as “hype” is therefore necessarily gradual, and context related (p. 13). The author walks through these deliberations, e.g., pointing out that grant proposals have a specific addressee that in contrast to laypeople understands what is to be believed given the evidence and what is to be imagined for sharing enthusiasm (p. 8). Her distinction between “explicit and implicit hype” that “causes readers to make an unjustified inference based on the omission of contextualizing evidence” (p. 6) further sharpens the conceptualization. Particularly, however, it points to the challenging complexity of communication.

While Kirsten Intemann suggests addressing the problem of hype by “training science communicators to be attentive to all the goals [and anticipating contexts and consequences] of science communication”, she concludes that context-insensitive empirical and NLP approaches to classify texts as hype are “challenged” (p. 12). As “a value-laden concept”, hype presupposes hermeneutic examination and context-sensitive assessment. In my opinion, however, pointing out these challenges takes studies on hype a good bit further. A possible juncture to study inferences and implicit hypes could be the (empirical) research about “imagining under constraints” (Kind, 2016) and the “narrative situation,” which makes “the set of protocols according to which the narrative is ‚consumed‘.” (Barthes & Heath, 1987, p. 116). Perhaps indicators for appropriate communication could be established in this way.

References Barthes, Roland; Heath, Stephen (1987): Image, music, text. London: Fontana Press. Kind, Amy (2016): Imagining under constraints. In Amy Kind, Peter Kung (Eds.): Knowledge through imagination. First edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press.