This is a note posted on the Peeriodical of "Hype and overpromising in science and technology."

Whether ethics should engage with hypothetical future scenarios is particularly relevant to the study of hype and overpromising. This engagement can further hype or alarmism and it is good to be aware of these possible negative consequences. It is precisely this relation between reflection on future scenarios and inflated expectations that philosopher Alfred Nordmann tackles in the article “If and Then: A Critique of Speculative NanoEthics”. Nordmann identifies and critiques what he calls if-and-then statements. These are statements which begin with an unlikely future scenario and then take this unlikely future as given in the second half of the statement, where it is either commended or critiqued. Nordman subsequently focusses on multiple aspects of these scenarios, namely how seriously we should take these scenarios, ethical concern as a limited resource, and that “questions prompted by the if-and-then are unintelligible”.

Due to the limited scope of this summary, the focus shall be on aspects of the article related to hype and overpromising. Although Nordmann does not explicitly identify them as such, if-and-then scenarios can be considered a form of hype or alarmism – hype’s negative twin brother. Because unlikely futures are taken as a given when ethicists commend or critique it, ethicists implicitly make these futures seem more plausible than they actually are – and thereby can contribute to hype or alarmism. Therefore, if-and-then statements should be abandoned and ethicists should focus on ethical problems issues which are already arising currently.

Nordmann finishes with three distinctions which need to be made once reliance on if-and-then has been abandoned. First, distinctions need to be made and maintained between current applications of a technology and imagined future applications of that same technology. The second distinction which needs to be made is between physical and technical possibility, i.e. between what is possible given the laws of physics and what is possible currently and in the foreseeable future given what is technologically available. And finally, the third distinction which needs to be made is between technology “that adapts the world to the requirements and needs of frail and limited human bodies” one the one hand and human enhancement technology on the other. This last distinction is particularly relevant to Nordmann’s critique of the idea of human enhancement, which is weaved through his critique of if-and-then statements. Making these three distinctions can prevent misleading the public and wasting the scarce and valuable resource of ethical concern: “ethical concern is a scarce resource and must not be squandered on incredible futures, especially when they distract from on-going developments that demand our attention”.